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THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE




The Solicitor General has authority to represent the United States before
the Supreme Court in cases “in which the United States is interested.”1  He also
has broad power to supervise litigation conducted in the lower courts by law-
yers representing the United States, its agencies, and its officials.2  The Solicitor
General is often—and correctly—said to have special responsibilities to the Su-
preme Court, responsibilities different in kind from those of lawyers repre-
senting private clients.  But the interesting and difficult questions about the So-
licitor General’s role do not directly concern his responsibilities to the Supreme
Court (“his” because no woman has yet been appointed Solicitor General—a
situation that will surely change soon).  Rather, the difficult questions have to
do with the Solicitor General’s responsibilities as a member of the Executive
Branch.  To what extent is he, like most other high-ranking executive branch
officials, properly concerned with carrying out the policies of the Administra-
tion in which he serves?  Or should he, instead, remain aloof from Administra-
tion policies and concern himself only with the institutional interests of the fed-
eral government?  And if the latter, how does one define the institutional
interests of the federal government?
Questions like these have arisen with some regularity in recent years.
During the Reagan and Bush Administrations, for example, the President took
the position that the Supreme Court’s decisions establishing a right to have an
abortion were wrong and should be overturned.  When cases reached the Su-
preme Court in which state abortion laws were challenged, the Solicitor Gen-
eral participated as amicus curiae and urged that Roe v. Wade3 be overruled.4
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1. 28 U.S.C. § 518(a) (1994).
2. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 0.20 (1998).
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellants, Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (No. 84-495).  The
episode is discussed in LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE
RULE OF LAW 135-54 (1987); CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN
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No federal programs were to be affected by these cases in any but the most in-
direct way; there were no federal laws forbidding abortion, for example.  In
that sense, the government’s institutional interests were not affected.  Was it
nonetheless proper for the Solicitor General to participate, in order to try to
persuade the Supreme Court to adopt what the Administration thought was the
right view of the Constitution?  Or should he have refrained from doing so, on
the ground that his responsibility was not to the Administration’s views but to
the government’s institutional interests?
II
THE ROLE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
These questions are the variant, for the Solicitor General, of the familiar
question for government lawyers:  “Who is the client?”5  There are, I think, two
plausible approaches.
A.  The Institutional Approach
What I will call the institutional view says that the Solicitor General’s re-
sponsibility is to the federal government as an institution, not to the President
or the Administration that he serves.  The United States is a litigant that brings
and defends suits in the courts, and its interest is in winning those suits.  Ac-
cordingly, there are certain things that lawyers in the Department of Justice do,
no matter who is Attorney General or President.  Government lawyers prose-
cute criminals.  When the government is sued for damages, they defend the
government.  They often defend government officials who are sued in their per-
sonal capacity for damages, for torts or constitutional violations.  When a stat-
ute, regulation, or government action is challenged as unconstitutional or oth-
erwise unlawful, government lawyers defend what the government has done.
They sue, or prosecute, violators of federal regulatory statutes.
This means that government lawyers will systematically find themselves on
one side of certain issues.  Not all issues: for example, the government can be
both plaintiff and (at a different time) defendant in an employment discrimina-
tion action.  But, if you want to represent criminal defendants, or tort plaintiffs,
or if you want to devote your practice to expanding First or Fourth Amend-
ment rights, or if you think congressional power under the Commerce Clause
should be narrowed, then you will not find much of the kind of work you want
in the Justice Department.
According to the institutional view of the Solicitor General’s role, the So-
licitor General represents the same interests in the Supreme Court that other
government lawyers represent in their day-to-day work.  The Solicitor General
just happens to represent the government on high-visibility issues in the most
                                                          
REVOLUTION 33-35 (1991); Joshua I. Schwartz, The President’s Lawyer as Frie(n)d, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1081, 1119-24 (1992).
5. See, e.g, Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293 (1987).
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visible Court, and so comes under pressure to act differently from other gov-
ernment lawyers.  But that is no reason for him to do so.
B.  The Administration Approach
The other view of the Solicitor General’s role, which I will call the Admini-
stration view, is that the Solicitor General is just like any other high-ranking
executive official:  His task is to help carry out the Administration’s program.
If the Administration’s position is that the government should be allowed to
forbid abortions, or that property owners should receive greater compensation
for takings, or that the Supreme Court’s standing cases are too restrictive, or
that statements obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona6 should not be used
even for impeachment, then the Solicitor General should try to advance those
positions—even though each of them (abortions aside) will actually impair the
government’s ability to win its cases.  This view emphasizes that the Constitu-
tion does not recognize the existence of an Executive Branch distinct from the
one that is directed by the President.  The idea that the Solicitor General has a
responsibility to a disembodied federal institutional interest that exists inde-
pendently of a particular Administration is, in all likelihood, just a way to en-
able career employees in the office, who may lack sympathy with the current
Administration’s agenda, to pursue their own.7
The institutional and Administration approaches would diverge not just on
the abortion case but on other cases that are much less highly publicized but
nonetheless quite important.  Consider, for example, the following situation,
again modeled on an actual matter that came before the Solicitor General’s Of-
fice:  A state government has asserted that sovereign immunity bars a claim for
damages for an alleged taking of property without just compensation.  The fed-
eral government faces similar claims and has in the past asserted a sovereign
immunity defense.  A loss by the state on the sovereign immunity issue will not
necessarily foreclose the federal government’s sovereign immunity defense, but
it will be a serious blow to the ability of the federal government to assert such a
defense.  The President and other Administration officials have taken the posi-
tion, in various contexts, that government is in general insufficiently respectful
of private property rights and should compensate property owners more often
for actions that diminish the value of their property.
The Administration view would at least entertain the possibility of filing a
brief calling for the abrogation of the sovereign immunity defense, even though
the result will be that the federal government will end up paying more money.
The institutional view would insist on the opposite position:  The role of the
Solicitor General is to defend the interests of the government as a litigant.  It is
a misuse of his office to undermine a sound argument that the government
might make.
                                                          
6. 384 U.S. 436 (1969).
7. For a view like this one, see John O. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The Solicitor Gen-
eral’s Office in Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799 (1992).
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This is not just a point about what might be thought of as the policies of a
conservative Administration.  Here is another example, adapted from events
that occurred in a Democratic Administration:  Private plaintiffs have sought
an injunction against a federal policy.  The federal government has a barely
colorable argument on the merits but an excellent argument that, under exist-
ing law, the private plaintiffs’ claim is not justiciable.  (Assume, to avoid other
complications and to make it more likely that what the government says will
matter, that the argument is not jurisdictional—for example, that the argument
is that the plaintiffs do not satisfy one of the “prudential” elements of stand-
ing.)  The Attorney General has taken the position that Supreme Court doc-
trine on these questions of justiciability is too restrictive.  Should the Solicitor
General forgo any argument that is inconsistent with the Attorney General’s
position, even if the effect is to turn a near-certain victory for the government
into a near-certain defeat?  Again the institutional view, on these facts, is clear:
The Solicitor General’s job is, at the least, to win cases for the government that
can be won by making responsible arguments.
III
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS THE “TENTH JUSTICE”
The distinction between the institutional and Administration view of the
role of the Solicitor General might seem to leave out of the picture one of the
most commonly held views: that the Solicitor General is not merely an official
of the Executive Branch but someone who has special responsibilities to the
Supreme Court—in some ways, a “tenth Justice.”8  One version of this ap-
proach, at least, is easy to describe and understand.  It holds that the Solicitor
General should simply take the position that reflects his best judgment of what
the law is, just as he would if he were literally a Justice.  In the abortion case,
under this approach, the Reagan and Bush Solicitors General acted properly if
(and only if) they themselves agreed with the President’s position on the consti-
tutional issue.
The problem with this view is that the Solicitor General is a member of the
Executive Branch, and it is not easy to see why a member of the Executive
Branch should adopt this view of his job.  Sometimes simply stating his impar-
tial view of the best understanding of the law may happen to be the best way
for the Solicitor General to help execute the laws.  But surely sometimes the
Solicitor General will better help execute the laws if he acts as an advocate,
seeking to advance a position that helps the government win what it is trying to
win in court.
In any event, this tenth Justice approach would, if implemented across the
board, be foreign to the long-standing culture of the Solicitor General’s Office.
No recent Solicitor General has adopted a policy of systematically refusing to
take any position that he would not vote for as a Justice.  Indeed I suspect that
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every recent Solicitor General could name many occasions on which he took a
position before the Court that he would certainly have voted against if he were
a Justice.  The Office sees its principal business as advocacy—not advocacy of
exactly the same kind that private lawyers do, but advocacy nonetheless.  Most
documents that the Solicitor General files with the Court do not take an even-
handed view of an issue; they seek to advance the side that favors the govern-
ment.
That is not to say that the Solicitor General should act in the same way as a
private lawyer.  To this degree, there is something to the tenth Justice idea.
Solicitors General have uniformly believed that they should confess error—
admit that a lower court judgment in favor of the party they represent was mis-
taken and should be vacated—in circumstances in which a private party would
not.  (Private parties’ confessions of error are essentially unheard of.)  And,
while confessions of error are not very common, it is not particularly unusual
for the Solicitor General to refrain from making an argument in favor of his po-
sition—when a private lawyer would make a comparable argument—because
he thinks the argument, although not frivolous, is simply too weak.  Solicitors
General have also consistently recognized an obligation to be more candid than
private lawyers about authority that opposes their position and about awkward
facts in the record.
Finally, in what is perhaps the closest approximation to the tenth Justice
role, the Solicitor General traditionally recognizes a responsibility to give rela-
tively candid views to the Supreme Court about matters that affect the Court’s
own jurisdiction and prerogatives—relatively candid compared not just to what
private parties would say, but to what the Solicitor General himself says when
engaged in straightforward advocacy on an issue that does not directly affect
the Court as an institution.  Thus, the Solicitor General has traditionally been
willing to admit that the Court might lack jurisdiction over an issue, or that a
case does not satisfy the Court’s usual criteria for granting certiorari, even when
the government’s litigating interests would be advanced by a contrary argu-
ment.
Notwithstanding all of this, I would venture that no one who has worked in
the Solicitor General’s office, at least in recent times, has ever doubted that he
was a lawyer representing a client, not an impartial judicial officer.  The Solici-
tor General is an advocate, and his principal day-to-day concern is promoting
his client’s interests.  His special responsibilities to the Court limit and qualify
the pursuit of the client’s interests, but advocacy on behalf of the client is the
central task.  The question is what such advocacy should consist of: whether it
should resemble the institutional or Administration view.
IV
THE COSTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION APPROACH
The difference between these two approaches is not just a peculiarity of the
Solicitor General’s job.  It reflects a genuine tension in the responsibilities that
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the Constitution assigns to the Executive Branch, which is responsible for en-
forcing laws enacted by Congress.  The tension arises because the President is
not simply the faithful servant of Congress.
No one would deny, for example, that the President and the Attorney Gen-
eral may take positions on issues that do not yet effect the laws that the federal
government enforces, such as when they propose legislation.  Beyond that, the
President or other Executive officials will take positions on issues that have es-
sentially nothing to do with any laws that the federal government enforces.
They might, for example, criticize (or praise) Supreme Court decisions on cer-
tain civil rights issues, abortion, or school prayer.  From time to time, Presi-
dents, in particular, take positions that might be inconsistent with the govern-
ment’s enforcement interests; they might call for an expansion of the ability of
private plaintiffs to win damages from the government, or they might criticize
the centralization of power in the federal government.  No one would think
that a President who took such a position was acting in a way that was inconsis-
tent with the responsibilities of his office.  The advocates of the Administration
view of the Solicitor General’s role say, in essence, that the Solicitor General
should help the President in carrying out these political aspects of the Execu-
tive Branch’s mission that go beyond simply executing the laws enacted by
Congress.
The fact that the President can properly act in ways that might be at odds
with the government’s enforcement interests does not, however, mean that
every executive branch official should feel free to do so.  Members of the
armed forces are of course employees within the Executive Branch, and they
are (as the Constitution itself specifies) subordinates of the President.  Yet
everyone would agree that in an important sense the military must not be used
to carry out the President’s political agenda.  While the separation of the
military from politics is perhaps uniquely important, a weaker version of the
same point can be made about government law enforcement agents, and indeed
about most government bureaucrats.  In principle, of course, they are to carry
out the Administration’s policies; but day-to-day, they serve institutional
interests, and there should be strict limits on the extent to which they carry out
a political agenda.
My view is that while the Administration approach to the Solicitor Gen-
eral’s role is in a sense correct in principle, something like the institutional view
should be followed in practice.  It is of course true that the Solicitor General is
a member of the Executive Branch.  In principle there is no reason to say that
he can refuse to accept the policy choices and priorities of the President and the
Attorney General.  More importantly, as I will discuss below, there does not
seem to be any way to give a fully coherent account of the institutional interests
of the United States that does not refer to the policy priorities of the Admini-
stration.  On the other hand, the best allocation of responsibilities within the
Executive Branch would be for the Solicitor General to confine himself, mostly
or entirely, to those things that the institutional approach endorses.  That is the
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role that the Solicitor General should seek to play within the Executive Branch,
and the President and Attorney General should let him play that role.
Consider again the abortion case.  It might be argued:  Why should the So-
licitor General not take a position in the Supreme Court just because the Ad-
ministration believes that the position is legally sound and believes that it is
imperative, as a matter of policy or morality, to take that position?  Why is it
necessary to show that the position also somehow advances the government’s
institutional interest in enforcing the law?
According to the logic of the institutional conception of the Solicitor Gen-
eral’s role, it might be argued, the Solicitor General should not have supported
the parties challenging segregation in Brown v. Board of Education9 and other
cases from the 1940s and 1950s.  At that time, the government had only a lim-
ited role in civil rights enforcement, and there was little federal institutional in-
terest in a ruling against segregation.  The Solicitor General’s participation in
those cases apparently was the result of a moral commitment and a political
calculation.10  The reapportionment cases—in which Solicitor General Ar-
chibald Cox urged the Court to reconsider precedents that permitted malap-
portioned legislatures—are another example.11
No one could say that the President would act improperly if he sought to
lend the moral authority of his office to, for example, the plaintiffs in Brown v.
Board of Education.  Quite the contrary: President Eisenhower’s lukewarm re-
sponse to the decision was seen by many as an abdication of his moral respon-
sibilities.  If the President could properly have supported the plaintiffs in
Brown in his speeches—indeed, perhaps even morally ought to have supported
them—why must the Solicitor General be barred from trying to implement
what the President sees as a moral imperative, by making arguments to the Su-
preme Court that might persuade the Court to reach the result that the Presi-
dent supports?  And, if this is true in Brown and the reapportionment cases,
then as an institutional matter—one can of course disagree on the merits—it
ought to be true in the abortion case as well.
On the other hand, there are costs when the Solicitor General participates
in such a case.  Those costs become clearer if one focuses not on a once-in-a-
generation case, like Brown or the abortion cases, but on whether the Solicitor
General should be able to subordinate federal institutional interests to the
Administration’s policy choices in less momentous cases, like sovereign immu-
nity or standing cases.  The costs derive from two sources.
                                                          
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. At least according to the somewhat controversial account given by Philip Elman, The Solicitor
General’s Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100
HARV. L. REV. 817, 818-19 (1987).
11. There is an argument that the federal government has an institutional role in these cases—the
Constitutional provision that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State . . . a Republican
Form of Government” was one of the bases on which the cases could have been decided—but that was
not the reason that the Solicitor General participated.  See U.S. CONST. art IV, § 4.
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The first is the relationship of the Solicitor General’s Office to the Court.
This is a more limited version of the often overstated “tenth Justice” idea.  The
Solicitor General’s Office appears before the Supreme Court dozens of times a
year.12  The Office’s reputation with the Justices, and the Court’s image of the
Office, are very important both to the Office’s ability to do its job for the Ex-
ecutive Branch and to the functioning of the government in general.13  If the
Court generally trusts the Office to engage in its traditional form of advocacy—
which, as noted above, falls somewhere between what a private party would do
and the impartial “tenth Justice” version—the Office will be more effective.
Moreover, the Court’s work can be greatly enhanced if the Court is able to
trust the Office in certain ways, because the Office can potentially be very
valuable to the Court.  The Office provides responsible and high-quality advo-
cacy, of course, but the Office is also one of the Court’s few sources of informa-
tion about the effects of legal rules and decisions in the world.  The Court is
constantly making judgments about those effects:  Is a particular lower court
decision important enough to warrant review?  Will a particular interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment really hamper law enforcement?  Will an interpreta-
tion of the Freedom of Information Act affect the ability to gather intelligence?
Much of the information the Court needs to make these determinations comes
from the Solicitor General, and it is difficult to see from where else the Court
could possibly get such information.  Moreover, the Court is necessarily in the
position of receiving not just factual information but also judgments from the
Solicitor General.  If the Court can trust the Solicitor General to provide accu-
rate information and reliable judgments, the Court’s ability to do its job is im-
proved.
The Solicitor General is engaged in advocacy, not impartial commentary or
advice, and the Court knows that.  But the Court has a significant community of
interests with the institutional agenda of the federal government, including the
Solicitor General’s Office.  The Court does not want to see the government un-
able to perform its legitimate functions. Receiving a responsible account of
what the government thinks it needs to discharge those functions—an advo-
cate’s account, but one intended to illuminate the government’s view of what it
needs—is a great asset to the Court.  When what the Court receives from the
Solicitor General is instead an argument, or a judgment, that is motivated by
political concerns—even political concerns of the highest moral order—the
Court is no longer getting the kind of material it most needs, and the commu-
nity of interest between the Office and the Court is eroded.
                                                          
12. Strictly speaking, the Solicitor General appears in hundreds of cases each Term, since he is the
respondent to many certiorari petitions.  In most of those instances, however, there is no serious ques-
tion about the outcome.  The cases in which the outcome is in doubt (including both certiorari petitions
and cases on the merits) numbers in the dozens.
13. For a development of these themes, see Neal Devins, Tempest in an Envelope: Reflections on
the Bush White House’s Failed Takeover of the U.S. Postal Service, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1035, 1040-41
(1994); Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255 (1994).
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In addition, as long as the Office engages in forms of advocacy that are fa-
miliar to the Court—defending the institutional interests of the government,
without regard to the political agenda of the Administration in power—the
Court has a good sense of the limits and value of the advocacy it is receiving.
Familiarity, in this context, is a signal virtue.  The Office will function best,
both in the achievement of its own objectives and in helping the Court do its
job, when it seems to the Court that it is seeing the same, familiar Solicitor
General’s Office in every case—preferably, the same Solicitor General’s Office
that it saw when the other political party was in power.  The Court can discount
for the Office’s professional biases and proceed accordingly.  The Court also
knows that, to the extent the Office is concerned with the government’s institu-
tional interests, rather than the Administration’s political interests, the Office
has a stake in maintaining a long-term relationship with the Court and will act
accordingly.  The Office will not risk its credibility for the sake of victory in a
single case.
When part of the work of the Office responds to a particular Administra-
tion’s political agenda, the relationship between the Office and the Court can
come unsettled.  Many issues that come before the Court are not high profile
political controversies like abortion but are nonetheless potential opportunities
for the Administration to score political points: areas like criminal law, civil
rights, environmental protection, antitrust, labor law, and tax enforcement, for
example.  If the Solicitor General’s Office sometimes takes positions because it
is promoting the Administration’s agenda, the Court is then entitled to wonder,
in each of these areas, whether it is hearing from the institutional Office—
which is concerned primarily with maintaining its relationship with the Court,
and with whose biases and predilections the Court is familiar—or the political
Office, which may be addressing not the Court but a very different audience,
and for whose tendencies and biases the Court will not have as good a feel.
More importantly, lawyers concerned with promoting a single Administra-
tion’s political agenda do not have the same incentives to maintain their long-
term credibility with the Court.  Once the Solicitor General and his staff are
free to go beyond the institutional interests of the government, and to advocate
a political agenda, they will naturally ask themselves:  Why should we husband
our credibility for institutional issues we care about less—or, worse still, for a
subsequent Administration—instead of spending it on our own political
agenda?  The point is not that adherents to the Administration view will engage
in misleading or other improper advocacy.  It is that, given the ongoing rela-
tionship between the Solicitor General and the Court, the Solicitor General
must be selective in almost everything he does: seeking certiorari, stays, or
summary reversals; using strong rhetoric (for example, arguing that a case seri-
ously impairs the government’s ability to enforce the criminal laws); and so on.
If the Office’s time horizon is four years, and if the Solicitor General sees his
agenda as the pursuit of a small number of politically salient causes, then he
will have an entirely different attitude toward this task, and the Office’s ability
to perform its institutional role will be weakened.
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The second set of costs that the Administration approach incurs have to do
with the internal culture of the Solicitor General’s Office.  Traditionally the Of-
fice has not been seen as a place where a lawyer goes to pursue a political
agenda.  On the contrary, people can work together for years in the Office
without a clear sense of each other’s political views.  An institutional ethos of
that kind acculturates lawyers to thinking of their task as the pursuit not of po-
litical objectives but of the government’s institutional interests.  Many lawyers
also join the Office relatively early in their careers, at a point where their view
of the job can be shaped by the existing culture in the Office.  To the extent the
Office comes to see itself as serving a political role, the lawyers in the office will
increasingly think of themselves in those terms.  The Office will become less at-
tractive to people who do not share the politics of the incumbent Administra-
tion.
This, too, would be a cost.  It is likely to lower the average quality of law-
yers in the office, because people of the opposing political persuasion will be
less interested in working there.  It will undoubtedly impair the Office’s effec-
tiveness with the Court—across the full range of cases—if the Office takes on a
partisan cast.  It will also be a difficult trend to reverse:  Once partisans of one
side have used the Office’s credibility and reputation for their cause, it will be
hard to persuade the other side, when it succeeds to power, not to do the same.
V
THE LIMITS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH
All of this seems to suggest that the Solicitor General should concern him-
self with the institutional responsibilities of the federal government and should
not promote a particular Administration’s political agenda.  But matters are a
little more complicated than that, in several respects.
First, an occasional political act by the Solicitor General’s Office may not
always have the costs I described.  A Solicitor General could plausibly say that,
so long as he adheres to the institutional view in every other case, he will not
harm the Office significantly by taking a position, in a case in which the gov-
ernment has no institutional interest, on a once-in-a-generation issue like abor-
tion or school desegregation.  The Court will recognize such a case as excep-
tional and will not think the Office has become politicized; lawyers in the
Office who are uncomfortable with that position will have many other cases to
work on.  In this way, the cases that are likely to damage the Office’s reputation
are, perhaps surprisingly, the less prominent ones—like the sovereign immunity
example given above.  It is the pursuit of an Administration agenda in the rela-
tively routine cases that will produce the most troublesome consequences.
That is what undermines the Court’s confidence in the Office, as well as the Of-
fice’s own internal culture.
The Reagan and Bush Administration’s advocacy in the abortion cases
might seem to be a counterexample; their calls for overturning Roe v. Wade
were widely seen to have politicized the Office.  When the Court refused to
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overturn Roe, its opinion seemed to suggest that the Administration’s efforts
had had the opposite effect.14  Of course, at least until the Justices’ papers be-
come available, any conclusions about what actually swayed them will have to
be speculative.  It may be that even in the once-in-a-generation case, the Solici-
tor General can step outside the institutional role only if the Administration’s
position does not touch a matter of intense political controversy (as in the re-
apportionment case) or when the legal culture is not deeply divided and the
dominant opinion is sympathetic to the Administration’s position (as, perhaps,
in the school segregation cases).
There is another, more fundamental reason that the Administration con-
ception of the Solicitor General’s responsibilities cannot be rejected outright.
The line between the institutional interests of the government and the political
agenda of a particular Administration is difficult to define.  Indeed, it is not al-
ways easy even to identify the institutional interests of the federal government
in the abstract, unconnected to a set of specific policies.  If an Administration
has decided that, as a matter of policy, the enforcement of the drug laws is es-
pecially important, the Solicitor General will naturally place a priority (in de-
ciding when to seek certiorari or to participate as an amicus, for example) on
expanding the government’s power to conduct searches.  Even the most rigor-
ous proponent of the institutional view would admit that the Solicitor General
may properly do that.  The same would be true if the Administration placed a
priority on environmental protection or antitrust or civil rights enforcement; no
one could reasonably expect the Solicitor General to ignore those priorities in
allocating his Office’s resources (time and energy; credibility with the Court).
By the same token, if an Administration decided that the federal government
was exercising too many powers that should be left to the states, it would only
make sense for the Solicitor General, even under the institutional view, to soft-
pedal efforts to expand federal authority at the expense of the states, and in-
stead to invest the Office’s resources elsewhere.
Another example that arose in essentially this form in the Reagan Admini-
stration shows especially clearly that the government’s institutional agenda is
not analytically distinct from the Administration’s policy agenda.  Suppose the
Administration has proposed legislation that would provide aid to religious
schools.  While the legislation is pending—with uncertain prospects of enact-
ment—a case reaches the Supreme Court in which indistinguishable state leg-
islation is challenged on constitutional grounds.  If that challenge succeeds, the
Administration’s proposed legislation would be unconstitutional.  Again the
line between the institutional view and the Administration view blurs.  There is
as yet no federal program that can be affected by the outcome of the case.  If
the Solicitor General participates in the case, he may seem to be acting as a
mouthpiece for the Administration’s political agenda rather than as a represen-
tative of the government’s institutional interests.  But it seems odd to say, even
under the institutional approach, that the Solicitor General can do nothing in a
                                                          
14. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867, 868 (1992).
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Supreme Court case that may doom what might otherwise be important federal
legislation.
A final and related point is that not all aspects of an Administration’s
agenda will be equally threatening to the Solicitor General’s relationship to the
Court and to the nonpolitical culture of the Office.  Some agenda items may
seem highly “political” in a bad sense; others, while not promoting recognizable
institutional interests, will not.  The religion example just given, to the extent it
is troubling, is troubling because the Court and other observers may believe
that the Office is taking a position just because it is trying to score political
points and not because it actually has something to say to the Court.15  Con-
versely, in the reapportionment cases, it seems unlikely that the Court would
have had this concern; that makes the Solicitor General’s participation less
problematic.  In an Administration that had not made public support for relig-
ion a central aspect of its political agenda, the Solicitor General’s relationship
to the Court (and the internal culture of the Solicitor General’s office) might
not be adversely affected by the Solicitor General’s decision to take positions
that arguably went beyond the government’s institutional interests.  In an Ad-
ministration that tried to gain political advantage by emphasizing its commit-
ment to enforcement of the criminal laws, even the pursuit of undeniable insti-
tutional interests—if the pursuit were perceived as being too vigorous—might
harm the Office’s credibility with the Court.
VI
CONCLUSION
No simple formula can capture the complex nature of the Solicitor Gen-
eral’s responsibilities. The conventional wisdom of career lawyers in the Solici-
tor General’s Office is that the Office serves the institutional interests of the
United States.  But the government’s institutional interests cannot be identified
in isolation from a particular Administration’s policy priorities.  In addition, it
is difficult to explain why the Solicitor General cannot occasionally take a posi-
tion in the Supreme Court solely to vindicate an Administration’s vision of the
Constitution; the costs of the Solicitor General’s doing so are unlikely to out-
weigh the benefits on every occasion.
On the other hand, there are substantial costs when the Solicitor General
departs from the institutional conception of his role.  It is no answer to incant
that the Solicitor General is a member of the Executive Branch and therefore
subordinate to the President.  The President, and the responsibilities of the Ex-
ecutive Branch, can be served in many ways.  By and large—not in every
                                                          
15. Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 416-17 (1985), referred
to the danger that such certain forms of public aid to religious schools would produce unhealthy politi-
cal division along religious lines—a discussion that has been read by some as suggesting that he was
reacting against what he perceived as the Reagan Administration’s treatment of this issue.  Aguilar
was overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
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imaginable circumstance, but by and large—the Solicitor General’s Office
serves them best by pursuing an institutional mission.
